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What is a Complex System?
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Co-evolving multiplex network
• Multiplex network, Mαij(t)
• Nodes i characterized by states, σβi (t)
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complex system = co-evolving multiplex
network
d
dt
σαi (t) ∼ F
(
Mαij(t), σ
β
j (t)
)
and
d
dt
Mαij(t) ∼ G
(
Mαij(t), σ
β
j (t)
)
can not solve this – but can observe it
• States of individuals are observable (big data)
• Networks are observable (big data)
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Part I: What is systemic risk?
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The three types of risk
• economic risk: investment in business idea does not pay off
• credit-default risk: you don’t get back what you have lent
• systemic risk: system stops functioning due to local defaults
and subsequent (global) cascading
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Economic risk
risk that business idea does not fly – fails – investments are lost
• who takes this risk? The financial system!
• this is a service of financial system to economy
• this service should not introduce new risks: as long as it does
→ financial system is ill designed
• management: hard to get rid of this type of risk
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Credit-default risk
if I lend something – there is risk that I will not get it back
estimate for credit-worthiness: assets–liabilities
• management: capital requirements for lending→ Basle-type
regulation
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Systemic risk
• risk that significant fraction of financial network defaults
• systemic risk is not the same as credit-default risk
• banks care about credit-default risk
• banks have no means to manage systemic risk
→ role of regulator: manage systemic risk
→ incentivise banks to think of SR
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Two origins of systemic risk
• synchronisation of behaviour: fire sales, margin calls,
herding including various amplification effects. May involve
networks
• networks of contracts: this is manageable
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How does systemic risk spread?
on networks of contracts: by borrowing!
if you borrow from systemically risky nodes→ you increase your
systemic risk
note: credit-default risk spreads by lending
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Systemic risk is a multiplex
layer 1: lending–borrowing network
layer 2: network of derivatives
layer 3: network of collateral
layer 4: network of overlapping pfolios
layer 5: network of cross-holdings
layer 6: liquidity networks
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Part II: Quantification of SR
iiasa nov 12 2015 14
Systemic risk – quantification
Wanted: systemic risk-value for every financial institution
Google has similar problem: value for importance of web-pages
→ page is important if many important pages point to it
→ number for importance → PageRank
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page is important if many important pages point to it
source Wikipedia cc-license
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institution system. risky if system. risky institutions lend to it
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Systemic risk factor – DebtRank R
... is a “different Google” – adapted to context of systemic risk
superior to: eigenvector centrality, page-rank, Katz rank ...
Why?
• quantifies systemic relevance of node in financial network with
economically meaningful number
• economic value in network that is affected by node’s default
• takes capitalization/leverage of banks into account
• takes cycles into account: no multiple defaults
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Systemic risk spreads by borrowing
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Systemic risk spreads by borrowing
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DebtRank Austria Sept 2009
(a)
note: size is not proportional to systemic risk
note: core-periphery structure
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Systemic risk profile
Austria
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Systemic risk profile
Mexico∗
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(b) combined
∗with Serafin Martinez-Jaramillo and his team at Banco de Mexico, 2014
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Daily assessment of systemic risk is possible
Mexico
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Systemic risk → expected systemic loss
Expected economic loss for bank i (stress testing)
Expected loss(i)=
∑
j pdefault(j).Loss-given-default(j).Exposure(i,j)
Expected systemic loss of bank j = pdefault(j) . DebtRank(j)
units: Euro / Year
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Expected systemic loss index for Mexico∗
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Lehman Brothers collapse
Uncertainty about the rescue of Greece
International alarm over Eurozone crisis
Loss on derivatives of Mexican companies
Subprime crisis
Mexican GDP fell by more than 10%
∗with Serafin Martinez-Jaramillo and team at Banco de Mexico, 2014
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Expected systemic loss index
• expected losses per year within country in case of severe
default and NO bailout
→ rational decision on bailouts
• allows to compare countries
• allows to compare situation of country over time
→ are policy measures taking action in Spain? in Greece?
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Observation
Systemic risk of a node changes with every transaction
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Austria all interbank loans
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Management of systemic risk
• Systemic risk is a network property to large extent
• Manage systemic risk: re-structure financial networks such
that cascading failure becomes unlikely, ideally impossible
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Systemic risk elimination
• systemic risk spreads by borrowing from risky agents
• how risky is a transaction? → increase of expected syst. loss
• ergo: restrict borrowing from those with high DebtRank
→ tax those transactions that increase systemic risk
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Systemic risk tax
• tax transactions according to their systemic risk contribution
→ agents look for deals with agents with low systemic risk
→ liability networks re-arrange → eliminate cascading
No one should pay the tax – tax serves as incentive to
re-structure networks
• size of tax = expected systemic loss of transaction (govern-
ment is neutral)
• if system is risk free: no tax
• credit volume should not be affected by tax
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Self-stabilisation of systemic risk tax
• those who can not lend become systemically safer
• those who are safe can lend and become unsafer
• → new equilibrium where systemic risk is distributed evenly
across the network (cascading minimal)
→ self-organized critical
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To test efficacy of tax: Crisis Macro-Financial
Simulator (schematic)
Banks
Firms
Households
loans
deposits
consumption
deposits
wages / dividends
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The agents
• firms: ask bank for loans: random size, maturity τ , rf−loan
→ firms sell products to households: realise profit/loss
→ if surplus → deposit it bank accounts, for rf−deposit
→ firms are bankrupt if insolvent, or capital is below threshold
→ if firm is bankrupt, bank writes off outstanding loans
• banks try to provide firm-loans. If they do not have enough
→ approach other banks for interbank loan at interest rate rib
→ bankrupt if insolvent or equity capital below zero
→ bankruptcy may trigger other bank defaults
• households single aggregated agent: receives cash from firms
(through firm-loans) and re-distributes it randomly in banks
(household deposits, rh), and among other firms (consumption)
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For comparison: implement Tobin-like tax
• tax all transactions regardless of their risk contribution
• 0.2% of transaction (∼ 5% of interest rate)
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Simulations: measure losses, cascades and
efficiency
• total losses to banks resulting from a default/cascade
• cascade size: number of defaulting banks in systemic event
• credit volume: total credit volume in interbank market
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Comparison of three schemes
• No systemic risk management
• Systemic Risk Tax (SRT)
• Tobin-like tax
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Model results: Systemic risk profile
Austria Model
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Model results: Systemic risk of individual loans
Austria Model
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Model results: Distribution of losses
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(a)
SRT eliminates systemic risk. How?
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Model results: Cascading is suppressed
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Model results: Credit volume
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(c)
Tobin tax reduces risk by reducing credit volume
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Implementation in reality
• Bank i requests loan of size Lij from bank j
• Bank j provides loan for interest I(Lij)
• Central Bank computes SRT(Lij) for transaction
• Cost for loan with bank j: I(Lij)+SRT(Lij)
• Bank i asks other bank k for same transaction Lik = Lij
• Costs for loan with bank k: I(Lik)+SRT(Lik)
• Bank i choses transaction partner for which costs are minimal
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Challenges – what could be wrong ?
• SRT is pro-cyclical – feedback: SRT hits most risky banks
hardest. Needed: ramp-up phase. Once system is in low-risk
equilibrium, there are practically no pro-cyclical effects
• SRT is useless if not all countries participate – arbitrage
possibilities for non-participating countries – same as for any
transaction tax
• Basel III takes care of Systemic Risk?
• the interbank network is not the relevant one – role
of derivatives, mutual cross-holdings, overlapping pfs, etc. →
apply SRT to other multiplex layers
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Basel III is does not reduce SR !
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Part III: Financial multiplex
networks
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Systemic risk multiplex of Mexico Sep 30 2013
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layer 1: derivatives network
layer 2: network of cross holdings
layer 3: foreign exchange exposures
layer 4: network of deposits and loans
layer 5: combined exposures
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Risk profile in the various layers
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systemic risk profile for different layers
DebtRank Rˆαi stacked for banks. Jan 2, 2007 – May 30, 2013
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Expected systemic losses for every transaction
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∆ELsyst > ∆ELcredit → defaults do not affect lender only
but involves third parties (all exposures 2007–2013)
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Conclusions
• systemic risk is a network property – endogenously created
• can be measured for each institution / transaction: DebtRank
• can be eliminated by SRT; networks don’t allow for cascading
• SRT should not be payed! – evasion re-structures networks
• SRT does not reduce credit volume; re-ordering transactions
• Basel III as planned does not work – 3 fold works – costly
• SR requires a multiplex network framework
• Expected Systemic Loss Index: compare countries, over time
• SR tax is technically feasible
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Alternatives to systemic risk tax
• Markose: taxes banks – not transactions – according to
eigenvalue centrality
Problem 1 eigenvector is not economically reasonable number
Problem 2 blind to cycles in contract networks
Problem 3 absurd size (up to 30% of capital)
• Tax size: misses small SR institutions, SR improvement at
tremendous economic cost
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Markose proposal in macro-financial ABM
Losses Output (GDP)
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Statistical measures
• CoVAR: descriptive – not predictive!
• SES, SRISK: related to leverage and size
• DIP: market based – markets do not see NW-based SR
pro data publicly available, easy to implement
contra ’conditional’ hard to define without knowledge of net-
works, descriptive, non-predictive
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